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ABSTRAK 
Isu kekerasan saat ini terus menarik perhatian publik seiring dengan gelombang bebas 
berekspresi, terlebih sejak masa reformasi tahun 1998. Angka kekerasan meningkat drastis, 
terkhusus kekerasan atas nama agama. Salah satu contoh kasus yang menjadi sorotan publik 
global adalah kasus kekerasan berbasis etnik dan agama di Maluku dengan jumlah korban 
meninggal mencapai 5000 jiwa dan lebih dari 7 juta penduduk direlokasi. Dengan 
menggunakan teori transitional justice dan resolusi konflik sebagai kerangka analisis, artikel 
ini akan meneliti sejauh mana kekuatan dan kelemahan strategi yang diterapkan dalam proses 
keadilan transisional pasca insiden Maluku. Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa meskipun ben-
trokan antar kelompok dapat tertangani melalui penegakan hukum dan berbagai proses medi-
asi, banyak kendala di lapangan dalam penegakan keadilan transisional yang salah satu 
faktornya adalah karena kurang adanya komitmen stakeholders dalam menimplementasikan 
proses tersebut secara komprehensif. Sebagai konsekuensi, kejadian serupa dapat berpotensi 
terulang kembali. Untuk mengatasinya, beberapa tawaran rekomendasi diajukan sebagai 
langkah preventif.  
Kata kunci: Keadilan Transisional, Kekerasan, Resolusi Konflik  
 
ABSTRACT 
Violence has been widely spreading across Indonesia following the wave of free speech 
and democratization after the collapse of Suharto regime in 1998. Previously known as a toler-
ant multicultural country consisting of various cultures, languages, tribes, ethnics and followers 
of different religions, Indonesia has currently become a country where mass violence attracts 
national and international attentions. One of the most destructive violence in modern Indonesia 
is the ethno-religious conflict in Maluku. Based on transitional justice and conflict resolution 
perspectives, this essay examines the strengths and limitations of the implemented strategies in 
dealing with this particular incident. The analysis concludes that even though physical contacts 
and violence among parties could be diminished by some initial judicial proceedings and me-
diations, future tensions appear to potentially occur as a result of a number of limitations in the 
implementation of post-conflict transitional justice. To cope with this issue, recommendations 
are provided as prevention approach.  
Key words: Transitional Justice, Violence, Conflict Resolution 
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INTRODUCTION 
Violence has been raising in Indonesia fol-
lowing the fall of Suharto regime in 1998. Pre-
viously known as a harmonious and multi-
tribes country1 consisting of a number of cul-
tures, languages, tribes, ethnics and religions, 
Indonesia now become a “violence country” 
attracting national and international atten-
tions. One of the most visible violence, which 
is also believed as one of the biggest commu-
nal wars in modern Indonesia2 (Ernas, 2012; 
Lange, 2000; Wessel, 2001), is the ethno-reli-
gious conflict in Maluku within the issue of 
different ethnics and religions. 
Given that this conflict has been causing 
many destructive impacts on the harmony of 
those involved parties, comprehensive evalu-
ation of the conflict resolution approaches 
taken by the stakeholders is essential for com-
munity development. This essay, therefore, 
will try to analyze strengths and limitations of 
transitional justice approach that has been ap-
plied to deal with that particular conflict. For 
the purpose of this essay, the theory of transi-
tional justice will be firstly discussed together 
with some other relevant conflict resolution 
theories. It will then come to the assessment 
                                                             
1  Wessel, I., & Wimhöfer, G., Violence in Indonesia, Abera-Verlag Meyer, 2001 
2  Ernas, S, Policy of Social Conflict Resolution: Implementation of the Malino Agreement in Maluku, Jurnal 
Studi Pemerintahan, 2012, 3(2). See also Lange, K. M., 2000, Prospects for Conflict Transformation in Ma-
luku: Mapping Assets, Spaces and Moments for Peace Building, and Wessel, I., 2001, The politics of violence 
in New Order Indonesia in the last decade of the 20th century, Violence in Indonesia, 2001, 64-81. 
3 International Center for Transitional Justice. What is transitional justice. Retrieved from 
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice at 3 November 2017 
4  Fischer, M., 2011, Transitional justice and reconciliation: Theory and practice. Advancing Conflict Transfor-
mation. The Berghof Handbook,2 
5  Barash, D. P., & Webel, C. P., 2013, Peace and conflict studies, SAGE Publications, Incorporated 
of the current implementations of conflict res-
olution approach for that ethno-religious con-
flict. This essay will then be concluded by 
some recommendations for future improve-
ment. 
Transitional Justice Framework 
Transitional justice is defined by Interna-
tional Center for Transitional Justice as “the 
set of judicial and non-judicial measures that 
have been implemented by different countries 
in order to redress the legacies of massive hu-
man rights abuses”3. Similarly, Fischer also 
identifies transitional justice as a broader con-
cept of judicial process to address human right 
violence4. Human right itself, in this modern 
time, is meant to be an umbrella term of basic 
needs of human being which includes individ-
ual liberty, political and socio-economic 
rights5. From these definitions, therefore, it 
can be concluded that the term transitional 
justice is used to reform strategies for the pur-
pose of victims’ recognition through a conflict 
resolution approach in recovering the impacts 
of massive human right abuses for the larger 
society. 
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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE 
ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN 
MALUKU 
Maluku is one Indonesian archipelago con-
sisting of many small islands located at the 
eastern part of Indonesia. These united islands 
were formerly populated by Ambonese ethnic 
group as indigenous community before a huge 
transmigration program was commenced by 
the government through sending people from 
Java to some other less populated islands in 
Indonesia in the beginning of 1960s, which 
made the islands become more diverse in 
terms of culture, ethnics and religion6. Maluku 
itself was previously well known as the name 
of one province in that area until the massive 
ethno-religious conflict occurred in Maluku in 
1999 resulting in Maluku split into two prov-
inces, North Maluku which is mostly popu-
lated by Moslems and Maluku province in 
which the majority populations are Chris-
tians7. 
Maluku’s Conflict at a Glance 
It was in 12 December 1998 when the ini-
tial conflict between two groups of different 
religion from different village, Wailete village 
Moslems and Hative Besar village Christians 
                                                             
6  Van Klinken, G., The Maluku wars: bringing society back in. Indonesia, 2001, 1-26 
7  Pariela, T. D., (n.d.). Political Process, Public Policy, and Peace Building Process: Case of Ambon City, Ma-
luku. 
8  Malik, I., 2003, Bakubae: The community based movement for reconciliation process in Maluku: Published in 
cooperation [among] BakuBae Maluku, Tifa Foundation, and Yayasan Kemala 
9  Van Klinken, 2001, op.cit. 
10  Malik, I., 2003, op.cit. 
11  (Human Right Watch Asia, 1999) cited in (Van Klinken, 2001, op.cit. 
12  Malik, I., 2003, op.cit. 
13  Palmer, B., Memories of Migration: Butonese Migrants returning to Buton after the Maluku conflicts 1999–
2002. Antropologi Indonesia, 2004, Special Volume 
of Southeast Maluku, was originated by their 
reciprocity actions in burning and rioting 
other properties triggered by a military mem-
ber8. This tragedy resulted in uncontrolled 
conditions among the community till in 14 
January 1999, eight members of both groups 
were killed9. Afterwards, as Malik goes on to 
further describe, many episodes of more ex-
tensive conflicts happened in Maluku fueled 
by “unhealthy” interactions towards each 
other10. 
The first period was in the beginning of 
1999 when in 19 January 1999 the local con-
flict between two young gangster groups, 
Christians indigenous Ambonese and Mos-
lems non-indigenous Ambonese, happened at 
the celebration of Islamic holiday Idul Fitri in 
Batu Merah transport terminal in Ambon, the 
largest settlement and the capital city of Ma-
luku11. It was then broadly perceived as a reli-
gious conflict which later spread out quickly 
causing many sporadic brawls throughout 
Ambon involving their religious commu-
nity12. In the end of this phase occur the ex-
pulsion of non-Ambonese community, con-
sisting of Buton with more than 160,000 peo-
ple13, Bugis and Makassar Moslems ethnic 
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groups, to their place origins or other secure 
place14.  
In the second and third episodes, the situa-
tions were more destructive since the religious 
issues widely affected the conflict and broader 
community was involved. While the second 
episode started from June 1999 when each 
community tried to physically defend the 
other party through offensive actions against 
each other within the involvement of the po-
lice from each group in conducting their ac-
tions, the third episode occurred in January 
2000 indicated by separatism issue from sep-
aratist groups wanting the sovereignty of Ma-
luku15.  
There were, in this last conflict period, 
many movement associations prosecuting the 
independence of Maluku, some of which were 
Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Maluku’s Front for 
Sovereignty) and the movement of Republik 
Maluku Selatan (The Republic of South Ma-
luku). The situation in this phase was even 
getting worse exacerbated by the involvement 
of many religious groups from other provinces 
to support their community16 such as Laskar 
Jihad (Islamic fighters) in supporting 
                                                             
14  Duncan, C. R., 2008, Where do we go from here? The politics of ending displacement in post-conflict North 
Maluku, Ithaca, NY:Conflict, Violence, and Displacement in Indonesia, Cornell University Southeast Asia 
Program Publications, & Malik, I., 2003, op.cit. 
15  Malik, I., 2003, ibid. 
16  ICTJ, 2011, Transitional justice in the United Nations Human Right Council: International Center for Transi-
tional Justice 
17  Van Klinken, 2001, op.cit. 
18  Malik, I., 2003, op.cit. 
19  Reid, A., 2011, Southeast Asia. The Singapore and Melaka Straits: Violence, security and diplomacy in the 
17th century. By Peter Borschberg. Singapore: NUS Press, and Leiden: KITLV Press, Pp. 394, Maps, Illustra-
tions, Index. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, 42(03), 543-546. 
20  ICTJ, 2011, op.cit. 
Moslems community17 leading to an armed 
war18. After all, this massive community con-
flict resulted in over 3,000 people brutally 
murdered, and around 500,000 people dis-
placed in North Maluku province19, or 5,000 
people death with more than seven million, 
one third of that province population, were 
displaced for a whole Maluku regions20. 
Restorative Justice and Conflict Handling 
Strategies 
There have been several strategies under-
taken by both government and non-govern-
ment institutions dealing with this ethno-reli-
gious conflict. Mostly based on the data report 
revealed by the joint team of ICTJ (Interna-
tional Center for Transitional Justice) and 
KontraS (commission for the Disappeared and 
Victims of Violence), an Indonesian NGO es-
tablished in response to the increasing number 
of violence after the fall of Suharto regime 
(2011), the undertaken mechanisms of transi-
tional justice in Maluku’s conflict will be pro-
vided as follows. 
1. Truth-seeking 
According to ICTJ and KontraS, there 
had been many efforts taken by  
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stakeholders in coping with this conflict in 
regards to seeking the truths and finding 
the facts21. The action for this stage was 
initiated by the establishment of National 
investigation team on Maluku. It was on 
12 February 2002 when the national gov-
ernment legalized Malino peace agree-
ment II, an agreement between two oppos-
ing parties to end the ongoing conflict and 
create peace in Maluku, which also in-
cluded an independent team established 
by the national government for investigat-
ing the conflict22. The investigation team 
consisted of 14 members under the presi-
dent mandate to find facts and analyze rel-
evant issues and events in Maluku for one-
year period. However, it was lately found 
that the final report of this investigation 
was canceled to release and the whole 
findings of that report remained un-
known23.  
2. Judicial proceedings 
The establishment of Human Right 
Court in Indonesia in 1999 following the 
UN permission to prosecute their citizens’ 
violations crime seems to be one im-
portant step of the Indonesian government 
                                                             
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
23  ICTJ, ICTJ Interview with a former member of the investigation team, Jakarta, 2008, cited in ICTJ, 2011, ibid. 
24  ICTJ, 2011, ibid 
25  McRae, D., Criminal justice and communal conflict: a case study of the trial of Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da 
Silva, and Marinus Riwu. Indonesia, 2007, 79-117 
26  UN General Assembly, 2005, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law. Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndRepara-
tion.aspx at 3 November 2017 
27  ICTJ, 2011, op.cit. 
in giving more attention to the human 
right abuses. However, there is no clue 
that the perpetrators of the ethno-religious 
violence in Maluku were prosecuted in 
this court. Having four offices located in 
Jakarta, Surabaya, Aceh and Makassar, 
this institution appears to be incapable to 
further proceed Maluku’s case24. One ex-
ample of judicial proceedings in the post-
war Maluku was the persecutions of key 
perpetrators in Maluku conflict by arrest-
ing those who responsible for their con-
ducting violence25. 
3. Reparations 
Reparation is identified by UN 
General Assembly as a recovery process 
in transitional justice “to promote justice 
by redressing gross violations of interna-
tional human rights law or serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law”26. 
It is aimed to acknowledge the trauma and 
pain of the victims of violence in order to 
help them repairing the consequences of 
the past events27. Therefore, this method 
should be adequate and effective in 
achieving those goals.  
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In terms of selecting the most suitable 
strategies in implementing this method, 
many approaches are introduced by schol-
ars to be applied in reparation programs. 
UN General Assembly, in particular, men-
tions that reparation programs could be 
formed as “restitution, compensation, re-
habilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of 
non-repetition”28. Those are the standards 
of reparation approaches that are hoped to 
be implemented in many conflicting re-
gions under the United Nations.   
Adapting other reparations programs 
in other countries based on international 
consensus, Indonesian government inte-
grates its reparations forms into legisla-
tion, court proceedings and peace agree-
ments29. In this regards, one of reparations 
programs applied for Maluku’s mass vio-
lence was the creation of monuments and 
martyrs cemeteries in memorizing the 
deaths of Maluku’s conflict victims in 
North Maluku30. Another form of repara-
tions was compensations given to the 
community and victims to rebuild their 
vandalized houses and their burnt 
Churches and Mosques, to replant their 
lands and farms, and to reimburse 
                                                             
28  Ibid.  
29  ICTJ, 2011, Op.Cit. 
30  Duncan, C. R., Monuments and martyrdom: Memorializing the dead in post-conflict North Maluku, Bijdragen 
tot de taal-, land-en volkenkunde/Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 2009, 
165(4), 429-458 
31  Ibid.  
32  Duncan, C. R, 2008, Op.Cit. 
33  ICTJ, 2011, Op.Cit 
34  Ibid.  
financial loss of their other properties31. 
Returning back non-indigenous commu-
nity from many different ethnic groups to 
their original lands also seems to be one 
strategy of both local and regional govern-
ment in these reparations programs, even 
though the accommodations of their new 
settlement were mostly inadequate as they 
were placed in camps as refugees32.  
4. Institutional reforms 
There have been some reformations 
undertaken in the institutions of Indonesia 
proved to be involved in the human right 
violence. Those reformations are mostly 
on the security system bodies since they 
often have direct involvement in the ongo-
ing conflict. In regards to this, ICTJ and 
KontraS frame those institutional reforms 
following Maluku’s conflict and other 
mass violence in Indonesia based on three 
different presidential regimes33. The first 
stage was shown by the initiative to re-
form security sector initiated by president 
Habibie in 1998 through separating the 
police institution from military bodies, re-
viewing military involvement in politics 
and sharing military great power with ci-
vilian authorities34. Whilst, president 
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Abdurrahman Wahid reformed the secu-
rity institutions by establishing a regula-
tion against military’s impunity and creat-
ing Ad Hoc Human Rights Courts in 1999. 
Under president Megawati leadership re-
placing former president Abdurrahman 
Wahid in 2001, however, those institu-
tional reformations programs decreased 
significantly shown by few efforts of the 
government in prosecuting past events and 
focusing more on the future orientation35.  
Some other institutional reforms to 
stop the violence were also applied in both 
police and military regional bodies, such 
as the regional chief of Maluku police re-
placement for seven times and the Maluku 
commander of regional Military replace-
ment for five times36. Furthermore, the 
commander of Pattimura military region, 
which was a Muslim, was replaced by a 
Balinese-Hindu to stabilize the tensions 
between two religious groups involved in 
that conflict. Those are the examples of in-
stitutional reforms strategies in regards to 
de-escalating the conflict situation.  
ASSESSMENT OF TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IMPLEMENTATION IN MA-
LUKU 
                                                             
35  Ibid. 
36  Bhakti, I. N., Yanuarti, S., & Nurhasim, M., 2009, Military Politics, Ethnicity and Conflict in Indonesia, Uni-
versity of Oxford:Centre for research on inequality, human security and ethnicity (CRISE) 
37  ICTJ, & KontraS, (n.d.), op.cit. See also Fischer, M., 2011, op.cit., Lambourne, W., Transitional justice and 
peacebuilding after mass violence. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2009, ijn037, and Boraine, A. 
L., Transitional justice: a holistic interpretation. Journal of International Affairs, 2006, 60(1), 17  
38  Boraine, A. L., Ibid. 
There have been a number of potential 
strategies effectively implemented by stake-
holders in dealing with this mass violence. 
However, evaluating and reviewing those 
strategies are still needed to maintain the ef-
fectiveness of that implementation. In fact, 
apart from some strength on each transitional 
justice stages, there are still a number of limi-
tations that should be taken into account. Be-
low are some general assessments of transi-
tional justice application in post Maluku’s 
mass violence. 
Lack of Effective Criminal Prosecution 
And Incomplete Judicial Proceedings  
The term criminal prosecution of 
International Center for Transitional Justice 
and Fischer can be linked to the legal justice 
and accountability concept introduced by 
Lambourne and Boraine37. In this regard, this 
mechanism is determined by them as a pro-
cess in which the perpetrators of the crime are 
encouraged to admit their crimes so that they 
will be judged and or punished following their 
actions. As Boraine goes on to further explain, 
there are several goals of this method, and one 
of them is to prevent perpetrators in repeating 
their actions38. However, since merely apply-
ing this method is often insufficient in 
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recovering the impacts of the violence for the 
victims or larger community39, applying some 
other approaches is still needed. Therefore, 
this method could be identified as one initial 
stage in achieving transitional justice after vi-
olence.  
In regards to Maluku’s case in particular, 
while the establishment of Human Right 
Courts seems to be potential in proceeding hu-
man right abuses and violations, it is found 
that there are actually other possible mecha-
nisms to proceed human right crimes, which 
are criminal courts trials, and military and 
joint military-civilian trials40. As a result, 
there seems to be some overlapping roles 
among those institutions to prosecute the judi-
cial proceedings of the violence’s perpetra-
tors, especially for those who act beyond in-
stitutional mandates.  
In addition, there appear to be some pres-
sure and intimidation of those justice institu-
tions in prosecuting the perpetrators of Ma-
luku’s conflict from some particular parties 
presumably involved in that conflict41. As a 
result, only few cases related to Maluku’s con-
flict were persecuted in the court. Indeed, it is 
clear that there seem to be some elites’ in-
volvements in the ongoing conflict in Maluku 
indicated by the unknown report result of 
                                                             
39  Anderlini, S. N., Conaway, C. P., & Kays, L., Transitional justice and reconciliation, Inclusive security, sus-
tainable peace: A toolkit for advocacy and action, 2004, 12 
40  ICTJ, 2011, op.cit. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Bhakti, I. N., et al., 2009, Op.Cit. 
43  ICTJ, 2011, Op.Cit. 
investigation team on Maluku. One example 
of this is that it was strongly indicated that 
there was direct involvement of military per-
sonnel in helping Laskar Jihad (Islamic fight-
ers) who came from Java in attacking police 
weaponry warehouse to steal police weap-
ons42. However, there was no clue of whether 
or not those personnel were prosecuted to ju-
dicial proceedings. 
The failure to release findings by the Com-
missions of Truth investigation team 
Government initiatives in establishing the 
Truth Commissions to find facts and seek the 
truths is actually quite effective. The investi-
gation teams had been created following the 
standard of Truth investigation commission 
implemented in the global world. However, 
since it also appears that there were many 
elites’ involvements in that case which led to 
manipulation of investigation results, the re-
port of that investigation findings was not re-
leased to the public43.  
Indeed, since the conflict in Maluku was 
apparently triggered by the involvement of na-
tional political figures, including military per-
sonnel under former president Suharto man-
date, considering some political issues in the 
analysis of transitional justice approaches 
would be important to identify some 
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connections of the tragedy with the involved 
elites in order to gain some possible solutions. 
In relation to this, many believe that the in-
volvement of security force, which was gen-
erally believed to act beyond Suharto regime, 
in the battle field of Maluku conflict was one 
strategy of the opposite elites against the on-
going government under both Habibie and 
Abdurrahman Wahid regime44. Furthermore, 
Bhakti et al. also suggest that “the riots in Ma-
luku were triggered by the presence of politi-
cal-military powers in society that deliber-
ately maintained tensions and the conflict po-
tential of the society” (p.25)45. Thus, given 
that conflict resolution is also aimed to pre-
vent the repeated tragedy, gathering the evi-
dence of relevant conflict factors such as po-
litical tendencies in order to be used to evalu-
ate institutions credibility for the purpose of 
institutional reforms is undoubtedly crucial 
for future orientation.  
RECOMMENDATION ON TRANSI-
TIONAL JUSTICE 
It could be clearly seen that both national 
elites and local stakeholders played an im-
portant role in de-escalating the conflict situa-
tions, and later led to its resolution, in Ma-
luku46. Apart from national government ef-
forts to resolve this conflict by proceeding 
                                                             
44  Bhakti, I. N., et al., 2009, Ibid. See also Sharp, S., 2011, Framing religious conflict: Primordialism writ large,  
and Van Klinken, 2001, Op.Cit. 
45  Bhakti, I. N., et al., 2009, Ibid. 
46  Pariela, (n.d.), Op.Cit. 
47  Ibid.  
48  ICTJ, 2011, Op.Cit. 
those four transitional justice mechanisms, lo-
cal government of Ambon City under the 
leadership of the elected Mayor and Vice 
Mayor in 2001 also regulated public policies 
in preventing further conflicts by managing a 
collaborative communication among law en-
forcement bodies (police), defense institution 
(military) and some other local stakeholders 
including religious scholars47. Thus, maintain-
ing those constructive actions organized by 
both national and local elites should be always 
taken into account as main program in order 
to prevent reoccurrence of the conflict. For the 
effectiveness of that program, involving com-
munity participation in designing and imple-
menting transitional justice mechanisms 
would be worthy.  
It is also useful to adopt some other transi-
tional justice approaches taken by other con-
flicting countries. In this regards, one example 
of the potential strategies to be adapted is the 
approach applied by the Council of Libya, 
Cote d’Ivoire, and Syria in establishing inde-
pendent commissions of truth-seeking and 
criminal investigations48. To ensure that those 
commissions are effectively managed and 
provide positive outcomes, they established 
clear directions of the relevant standards from 
the experts for the commissions to be 
90 Yurispruden  Volume 1, Nomor 1, Januari 2018, Halaman 81-92 
 
followed, and the involvement of supervision 
team to ensure that recommendations pro-
vided by the commissions would be approach-
able and sustainable49. As a result, the imple-
mentation of transitional justice through truth 
commissions would be more effective, trans-
parent and manageable.  
Finally, evaluating the current justice insti-
tutions by formulating clear directions of each 
institution would be needed in order to avoid 
overlapping among them in prosecuting the 
cases. By this, it is hoped that pursuing perpe-
trators to the judicial proceedings following 
their violent actions would be more well-han-
dled.  
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this essay has analyzed the 
implementation of transitional justice on Ma-
luku’s ethno-religious conflict by describing 
the four undertaken strategies in de-escalating 
the conflict sonsisting of truth-seeking, judi-
cial proceedings, reparations programs and in-
stitutional reforms. Those mechanisms were 
adopted from the standard of transitional jus-
tice published by the United Nations. While 
some of those implementations seem to be 
well organized, such as the establishment of 
Truth Commissions and some Institutional re-
forms in security systems, others are not ef-
fectively conducted, including the judicial 
proceedings which seem to avoid persecuting 
military personnel who had been involved in 
triggering the violations.  
Furthermore, those mechanisms seem to be 
left behind without any further actions result-
ing in incomplete conflict handling system as 
a result of the elite’s involvement. Therefore, 
for future development, those who are in 
charge in transitional justice implementation 
should be an independent body without any 
outside intimidations so that the comprehen-
sive transitional justice could be effectively 
implemented. Finally, since many other rec-
onciliation processes were also conducted by 
local community, such as Christian-Muslim 
Alliances in Ambon Island50, Bakubae move-
ment (Malik, 2003), and sport activities as a 
means for reconciliation51, combining transi-
tional justice, non-violence and reconciliation 
could be more effective in the conflict resolu-
tion process.  
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